Terrorism litigation as deterrence under international law: from protecting human rights to countering hybrid threats by Bachmann, Sascha
22
Amicus Curiae Issue 87 Autumn 2011
INTRODUCTION
This article provides a brief overview of the current state
of anti-terrorism litigation under US federal law for the
adjudication of international torts such as terrorism and
other serious human rights violations. Corporate terrorism
litigation focuses on the role and impact of both corporate
and individual financial aiders and abettors of international
terrorism and explores the desirability and feasibility of
subjecting these non-state actors to transnational human
rights litigation.
The threat of international terrorism represents one of the
most severe “hybrid threats” which NATO attempts to counter:
hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional
means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives (see
https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/2010201
1CH/Experiment/PlanningCo/CHTExperim. The author took
part in this experiment in May 2011 as NATO Rule of Law
SME participant). Combating terrorism requires a holistic
approach which combines hard kinetic security operations with
the options of criminal prosecution and civil reparations
through litigation.
So called “bankrupting terrorism” lawsuits (cf Shurat
HaDin Israel Law Center which uses this term to refer to US-
Israeli terrorism litigation, see http://www.israellawcenter.org)
refer to civil litigation which is directed against “funding”
activities (eg direct payments to terrorist groups) and other
forms of aiding and abetting (such as the provision of material
support) qualifying as “indirect” or secondary liability of the
corporate actors. Much in this area focuses on responsibility
and liability of corporations such as banks (see the case Arab
Bank I, 384 F.Supp. 2d 580), NGOs and religious charity
organisations within their respective litigation context (cf the
case of Boim v Quranic Literacy Inst, 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 –1003
(7th Cir.2002), also referred to as Boim I). Such “indirect
liability” litigation should not be confused with litigation
which is directed against the terrorist group itself such as al
Qaeda or Hamas (See Boim litigation cases consisting of the
cases Boim I, Boim v Holy Land Found. for Relief Dev, Nos. 05-
1815,05-1816,05-1821,05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007) and Boim
III 549 F.3d 685, 687 97th cir.2008). This short article aims
to provide a brief overview of the potential role US styled
terrorism litigation can play in countering threats of terrorism
as one of the more serious hybrid threats.
1. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Corporate accountability for aiding and abetting acts of
international terrorism is based on the (evolving) notion of
civil corporate responsibility for basically a tort (delict)
which qualifies as both an international crime as well as a
“gross” human rights violation. An early and well
documented example of corporate complicity in the
commission of gross human rights violations can be seen in
the so called Industries cases before the US Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg: US v Friedrich Flick (VI Trials of War
Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control
Council Law No 10 (1952), 1217, 1222), US v Alfred Krupp
(Vol. X Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1949) 130-159)
and Bruno Tesch and others (I Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals (1947) 93 – 103).
These trials established criminal responsibility of the
individual officer and agent of a corporation for their
actions of aiding and abetting in the crime of the Shoa/
Holocaust. However, corporate criminal responsibility
supplementing individual criminal responsibility never
found its way into the Nuremberg principles (Principles of
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International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 2
International Law Commission Year Book 1950 (1957) 374 –
78) nor did the statutes of the two UN ad hoc tribunals, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contain
such a provision. This omission continues to this day with
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague
failing to add corporate criminal responsibility to Article 25
of its Rome Statute of 1998. Consequently, there is to date
no recognition under international law of a distinct
principle of corporate criminal responsibility for the
commission of gross human rights atrocities and terrorism.
The increasing of business activities of multinational
corporations (with a particular focus on exploitation
industries) in the emerging (developing) world (P
Blumberg, “Asserting human rights against multinational
corporations under United States law: Conceptual and
procedural problems’”, (2002) 50 American Journal of
Comparative Law, 493) has also led to an rise in reports on
corporate collusion in gross human rights atrocities (see
for example O De Schutter Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland, 2006); A
Ramasastry and R Thompson, “Commerce, crime and
conflict – Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for
Grave Breaches of International Law”, (Fafo Institute of
Applied International Studies 2006)) leading to well
publicised transnational lawsuits before US federal courts
(John Doe I v Unocal Corp, 403 F.3d 708 an for an overview
B Stephens, et al International Human Rights Litigation in US
Courts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008).
Corporate accountability leading to financial remedies
and reparations as a consequence can be seen in the United
Nations’ Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights of 2003 (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2)
which constitute a future set of non-voluntary norms for
corporations. Adopted by the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, they were not
recognised by the UN Human Rights Commission (as the
predecessor of the Human Rights Council until 2006 was
known). Since then, the UN’s Special Representative of the
Secretary General, Ruggie, has been working on the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (John
Ruggie – Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework of March 21, 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31). It
has to be seen whether such initiatives will be successful.
2. US HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM
TORT LITIGATION
US human rights litigation against the individual and
corporate defendant, as perpetrator or aider and abettor of
human rights violations as well as international terrorism has
developed as a notion of accountability over the last 30 years.
Such litigation, which became otherwise known as
transnational litigation, began with seminal case of Filartiga
v Pena- Irala (630 F.2d 876) in 1980, which concerned acts
of (state sponsored) torture which were committed outside
the territory of the USA with non-US citizens as both
victim and perpetrator. The court established US federal
jurisdiction in this extraterritorial case by utilizing a statute
from 1789 which had been dormant for nearly 220 years,
the so called Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA, now being
referred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)).
This piece of legislation confers subject matter
jurisdiction to a US federal court when: (1) an alien
plaintiff sues, (2) for tort only (3) based on an act that was
committed in violation of either the law of nations or a
treaty of the US. The range of possible torts (arising “of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express in international accords, that a wrong generally
recognized becomes an international law violation within
the meaning of the (ATCA) statute” (Filartiga at 888)) as
case law arising from such international law violations
developed over the last 30 years certain norms and criteria
whose breaches qualify as violations of the law of nations
and are therefore actionable as ATS/ATCA torts.
Lawsuits against corporate and state sponsors of
terrorism can be brought under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS/ATCA – 28 USC Section 1350), the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA-28 USC Section 1350), the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA-18 USC Sections 2331-2338) as an
amendment to the above ATS, the “State Sponsors of
Terrorism” exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA Exception-28 USC section 1605 (a) (7), which
allows lawsuit against so called state sponsors of terrorism),
and finally the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).
In order to determine whether a violation of
international human rights and international humanitarian
law may qualify as an actionable violation of the law of
nations as required under the ATS, the so called “law of
nation” test was developed in the case Forti v. Suarez-Mason
(672 F Supp 1531 (ND Cal 1987)) whereas any violation
had to be “universal, definable and obligatory” (The so
called Forti test consists actually of two parts, Forti I and II
with the former outlining the requirements for the jus
cogens nature of actionable torts and the latter defining the
“universality” criteria thereof). Generally speaking, the
following human rights violations can establish US federal
jurisdiction under the ATS: torture, summary execution or
extrajudicial killing, genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, disappearances, arbitrary detention and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as
international terrorism and hostage-taking (B Stephens 63
– 92). The TVPA grants jurisdiction for legal actions
brought by US citizens for acts of (state) torture and/or
extra-judicial killings. Section 2 (a) TVPA states that: 23
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“an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual
to torture shall, in a civil action be liable for damages to that
individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extra-judicial
killing, shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the
individual’s legal representative, or any person who may be a
claimant in an action for wrongful death”.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1994 makes provisions for
civil lawsuits for injuries and losses sustained through an
act of international terrorism which would otherwise not
pass the above Forti test and closes a litigation gap where
acts of terrorism did not qualify as an actionable tort under
the ATS, as highlighted in the Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic
litigation of 1984 (726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) Exception of
1996 limits the defense of state immunity in cases of state
sponsored terrorism and can be seen as a direct judicial
response to the growing threat of acts of international state
sponsored terrorism directed against the USA and her
citizens abroad, as exemplified in the case of Flatow v
Islamic Republic of Iran (76 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999)).
It amends the original FSIA (28 U. S. C. §§ 1602 – 1605)
in order to permit a civil suit against designated state
sponsors of terrorism (Currently there are four countries
designated as such: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria, see
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm) for acts of torture,
extra-judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, or
the provision of material support or resources for such an
act if the act or provision of support is engaged in by an
official agent of the foreign state while acting within the
scope of his or her duties.
In 2001 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act was amended under the 2001
PATRIOT Act to allow lawsuits for acts of terrorism against
groups alleged to have engaged in racketeering activity,
including murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery and fraud, as
well as acts of terrorism. So far, RICO has not been used
successfully in a lawsuit against alleged ‘sponsors’ of
international terrorism and terrorist groups like al Qaeda,
see the case of Rux v Republic of Sudan of 2007 (WL
2127210 (E.D.Va.)).
3. CORPORATE TERRORISM LAWSUITS
The wider, non terrorist – related, litigation of
corporate collusion in violations of international human
rights and international humanitarian law has seen cases
for corporate collusion in the commission of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, widespread torture: the case of Doe
I v Unocal (403 F.3d 708) in 2005 concerned alleged
corporate complicity in forced labour and torture, Wiwa v
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (226 F.3d 88, 157 (2d Cir
2000)) alleged an involvement of the Royal Dutch/Shell oil
group in human rights abuses in Nigeria, including the
1995 torture and murder of the environmental and
community leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, the case of Sarei v Rio
Tinto (487 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007)) involved
corporate complicity in the commission of war crimes by
Security Forces in Papua New Guinea.
Corporate terrorism litigation is essentially a new form
of the already well established notion of corporate
collusion in human rights violations and centers around the
question of corporate aiding, abetting and the overall
facilitating of such terrorist activities: thus raising the
question of what standard of liability should be applied. In
the Arab Bank cases, it was alleged that such corporate
support could take the form of providing material support
such as financial services, providing funds or collecting
funds for different terrorist organizations operating in
Israel, such as terrorist groups such as Hamas, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (See Oran
Almog, et al, v Arab Bank, PLC ((04-CV-5564(NG)(VVP),
Gila Afriat-Kurtzer, et al, v Arab Bank PLC ((05-CV-
0388(NG)(VVP)), Linde v Arab Bank, PLC (384 F Supp 2d
571 (E.D.N.Y 2005)) and Almog v Arab Bank, PLC (471
F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y 2007)). The case In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001 (349 F.Supp 2d 765
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)) set as a guiding threshold and standard
for such collusion the evidence of “substantial assistance or
encouragement to the primary wrongdoer.”
The liability standards in corporate aiding and abetting
lawsuits follow the overall precedent set in the litigation of
so called “historical justice claims” (B Stephens, 23-24.):
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation ((Swiss Gold Bank case)
105 F Supp 2d 139 (EDNY 2000)) and In re Nazi Era Cases
Against German Defendants Litig (198 FRD 429 (DNJ) MDL
No 1337 DNJ Lead Civ No 98-4104 (WGB) (2000)) and
the ongoing Apartheid lawsuits (In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 02 MDL 1499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) which continues
the original 2004 case of In re South African Apartheid
Litigation (346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
Corporate aiding and abetting liability breaks with the
stricter liability standard of the Kadic v Karadzic (70 F3d
232 (2d Cir 1995)) rule, whereas the corporate defendant
had to exercise some form of control over state
perpetrators’ actions (cf Symposium on “Corporate liability
for violations of international human rights law” in 114
Harvard Law Review (2001), 2039) The judgment in the
above discussed Wiwa case clarifies that corporate “aiding
and abetting” takes place simply by financing and
supporting knowingly state sponsored human rights
violations. It does therefore not follow the stricter “overall
control” test of Tadic (Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Judgment
Appeals Chamber (ICTY), 38 ILM 1518, 1549) and the
“effective control” test of Nicaragua (Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep 1986, 62 et seq).
The 2010 case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (No. 06-
4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept.
17, 2010)) concerns the question whether the ATS can be
applied to aiding and abetting activities of corporations: to
what extent this case will limit or even exclude such24
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torts/delict action against the corporate colluder in human
rights violations and acts of terrorism will have to be seen.
4. CONCLUSION
Human rights litigation in the USA has altered existing
perceptions of the role of corporations in the commission
of human rights atrocities: the assertion that only states
(and non – state actors of a Kadic nature) could commit
such crimes has been changed through the emergence of
the new notion of civil corporate accountability: the two
Holocaust lawsuits as well as the ongoing Apartheid
litigation are examples hereof. The key principles of
corporate complicity in gross human rights violations do
also apply in cases of liability for aiding and abetting in acts
of international terrorism. US transnational litigation
acknowledges the new standing of the victim of such
human rights abuses as well as terrorism as an individual
claims holder (as evident for example under the European
Convention of Human rights, see eg the individual
application procedure under Art 34 of the ECHR)
acknowledging his/her own right ius standi. Traditional
concepts of interstate reparations for breaches of
international law are supplemented by a new, hybrid form
of liability which combines elements of private civil tort
litigation with elements of international law.
In Europe, the absence of such human rights/terrorism
litigation is an unfortunate fact; nevertheless, the dicta of
US styled Filartiga litigation have already influenced our
domestic jurisprudence, as the House of Lord’s ruling in
Ronald Grant Jones v The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-
Arabiya as Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) & Anor
([2004] EWCA Civil 1394 et seq, paras 61-68) shows
where the Law Lords reflected on the universal nature of
the crime of torture. It has to be seen what the further
ramifications of such a form of litigation are for the
development of alternative means of accountability and
deterrence.
Directly linked to this observation is the question to
what extent aiding and abetting or so called “donor
liability” of the corporate colluder in acts of terrorism can
fall under the jurisdiction of US federal courts established
under the ATS and ATA.
The use of US human rights litigation as an additional
means of fighting international terrorism globally as part of
a wider anti – terrorism strategy has its limitations if not
developed further into an internationally recognised
institute of granting legal and remedial redress to victims of
terrorism and gross human rights abuses.
• The topic has been presented to audiences at the uni-
versities of Stellenbosch and Cape Town, South Africa
and the IALS, and draws from findings of an ongoing
UK- Israeli research collaboration with colleagues from
Hebrew University (HUJI), Jerusalem.
Dr Sascha-Dominik Bachmann
Assessor Jur, LLM LLD, Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University
of Portsmouth. The author works as an international law lecturer with the
School of Law, University of Portsmouth. Outside academics his
professional experience includes working in various capacities as an Army
reserve officer (Lieutenant Colonel) and taking part in peacekeeping
missions in operational and advisory capacities. The help and assistance of
Dr Peter Andrew, University of Portsmouth and Pini Miretski, HUJI is
gratefully acknowledged.
19168 Amicus 87 Autumn text.qxd:Text  10/11/11  13:41  Page 25
